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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether municipal mergers could internalize spatial spillover effects by 
comparing mergers before and after they occur, especially focusing on local public library services 
in Japan. A spatial spillover effect occurs when the benefit of a local public service spreads across 
not only its own administrative district but also into neighboring ones. A free rider problem among 
municipalities might be caused when a municipality makes a policy decision regarding how much it 
supplies to its own local public service under a decentralization system, recognizing the existence of 
a spatial spillover effect. Under such circumstances, spatial spillover effects might be internalized 
through municipal mergers. In Japan, the boundaries of administrative districts—including those of 
municipalities—have been determined based on traditional or historical reasons. However, large-
scale municipal mergers took place in FY2004 and FY2005 due to serious fiscal deficits and a 
rapidly aging population. Consequently, the number of municipalities in Japan has decreased from 
3,232 to 1,820. In light of these facts, we examine whether municipal mergers internalize spatial 
spillover effects, focusing on Japanese local public library services, by applying cross-sectional 
spatial autoregressive models. As a result, we found that there are spatial spillover effects in public 
library services both in FY2001 (before) and in FY2008 (after). We also found that the impact of 
such spillovers in FY2008 is smaller than that in FY2001. The results imply that municipal mergers 
could at least partially internalize spatial spillover effects among municipalities. 
 
JEL: H70, H75, H77 
Keywords: spatial spillover effect, municipal mergers 
 
Version: Feb. 13, 2017 
                                                   
* The authors wish to thank Takashi Kuramoto, Shigemichi Kanasaka and Shin Saito for their useful 
comments and suggestions. The authors also acknowledge the financial support of a Grant-in-Aid for 
Scientific Research (B) (No. 15H03361)) , Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)(No. 26780181) and 
Grant-in-Aid for challenging Exploratory Research(No.16K13371) from the Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science. 
a Hitoshi Saito, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics, Kobe International University; 
9-1-6 Koyo-cho Naka, Higashinada-ku,Kobe, Hyogo, 658-0032, Japan. E-mail: saito.hit
osi@gmail.com 
b Haruaki Hirota, Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, Musashi University; 1-26-1 
Toyotama-kami, Nerima-ku, Tokyo, 176-8534, Japan. E-mail:hirota@cc.musashi.ac.jp 
c Hideo Yunoue, Associate Professor, School of Economics, University of Hyogo; 8-2-1 
Gakuen-nishi, Kobe, Hyogo, 651-2197, Japan. E-mail:yunoue@econ.u-hyogo.ac.jp 
d Miki Miyaki, Assistant Professor, College of Business, Rikkyo University; 3-34-1 Nishi-
Ikebukuro, Toshima-ku,Tokyo, 171-8501, Japan. E-mail: miyaki@rikkyo.ac.jp 
1. Introduction 
The spatial spillover effect 1 occurs if the benefit of a local public service spreads not only 
across its own administrative district but also to neighboring ones. In this situation, when a 
municipality makes a policy decision about how much to supply a local public service in a 
decentralized system, a separate local government may “free-ride” on the policies undertaken by 
other local governments. In Japan, there is a high likelihood that while one municipality may 
supply numerous public goods, the area to benefit may differ according to the type of goods, 
leading to spillovers and free-riding by other local governments. 
 Several previous studies, such as from Sweden, the United States, Spain, and Japan, confirm 
that local governments do free-ride on other local governments (e.g., Case et al., 1993; Figlio et 
al., 1999; Hanes, 2002; Finney and Yoon, 2003; Baicker, 2005; Lundberg, 2006; Solé-Ollé, 
2006; Akai and Suhara, 2013).2 These studies find significant free-riding behavior in terms of 
public facilities and related costs.3 We now consider whether changes in jurisdictional areas 
reduce or remove this free-riding behavior. 
Municipal mergers are a type of change in jurisdictional area. From 1999, Japan conducted 
nationwide municipal mergers to establish an administrative foundation for core local 
governments, which were expected to shoulder the responsibilities resulting from the regional 
devolution of power. In the decade between March 31, 1999 and March 31, 2010 when the 
mergers were largely completed, the number of municipalities decreased by around half, from 
3,232 to 1,727.4 About 80% of these mergers occurred in 2004 and 2005, with 215 and 325, 
respectively. The concentration of municipal mergers within this period was due to better 
financial support measures in the Special Municipal Mergers Law, whereby acquisitions could 
only take place if the mergers occurred before March 31, 2006. 
 Many studies investigated the effect of municipal mergers on financial affairs. First, 
researchers examined the effect of a decrease in annual expenditures following municipal 
mergers using data from Israel, Japan, and Germany (e.g., Miyazaki, 2006; Reingewertz, 2012; 
Hirota and Yunoue, 2013; Blesse and Baskaran, 2016). These studies differ in terms of the 
forms of the mergers and affected expenditure items, but there are many indications of possible 
decreases in expenditures due to municipal mergers. In addition, Miyazaki (2006) and Hirota 
and Yunoue (2013) indicated the possibility that expenditure temporarily increases in the initial 
stage of a merger. 
Other studies examined consensus forming amongst the merging municipalities (e.g., 
Nishikawa, 2002; Hirota, 2007; Kawaura, 2010; Miyashita, 2011; Miyazaki, 2014; Nakazawa 
and Miyashita, 2014),5 many of which confirm that the smaller the municipality’s surface area, 
the more likely it is to choose to undergo mergers. Further, Miyazaki (2014) confirmed the 
                                                   
1  Solé-Ollé (2006) indicated two types of spatial spillover effects: benefit spillovers and 
crowding spillovers. The former refers to the provision of public services that transcend areas of 
jurisdiction, such as radio or television broadcasting. In the latter, facilities such as art museums 
and parks become crowded due to commuter traffic and visitors who live in neighboring 
regions. 
2 Nonetheless, there are differences in the results, even for the same cultural services: Lundberg 
(2006) detected free-riding behavior; others, such as Murdoch et al. (1993) and Werck et al. 
(2008), found positive spatial correlations in expenditure competition. 
3 This behavior occurs for libraries (Finney and Yoon. 2003), recreation and cultural services 
(Lundberg, 2006), and cultural expenditures (Akai and Suhara, 2013). These are examples of 
Solé-Ollé’s (2006) crowding spillovers, or from both crowding and benefit spillovers occurring 
together. 
4 In Japan, the fiscal year begins on April 1 and ends on March 31. 
5 Gordon and Knight (2009) also analyzed the reorganization of school districts in Iowa. 
greater likelihood of agreement to municipal mergers in regions with larger spatial spillover 
effects. 
 Numerous studies in Sweden, the United States, Spain, and Japan also featured investigations 
into free-riding behavior amongst municipalities before and after a merger (e.g., Hinnerich, 
2009; Jordahl and Liang, 2010; Hansen, 2014; Nakazawa, 2015; Hirota and Yunoue, 2016). The 
results showed that smaller-scale municipalities tended to issue municipal bonds and free-ride 
on merged municipalities. 
 Thus, existing research into free-riding behavior amongst merged municipalities before and 
after mergers found a decreasing effect of expenditure post-merger and consensus forming 
amongst merged municipalities. However, there are no studies on the effect of municipal 
mergers on free-riding behavior amongst municipalities. Yet, Solé-Ollé (2006) indicated the 
potential for the undersupply of a service when positive spatial spillover effect occurs. One 
possible solution may be to internalize the positive spatial spillover effect and thus remove or 
decrease the undersupply by changing jurisdictions through municipal mergers. 6 
 Miyazaki (2006) and Hirota and Yunoue (2013) suggested that expenditure may temporarily 
increase in the initial stages of a merger, which may also indicate a temporary increase in costs 
in order to lessen undersupply. In particular, Miyazaki (2006) showed a rise in construction 
costs. This may be due to previous spatial spillover effects and undersupply of public facilities 
before the municipal merger, which decreased following the merger and construction costs rose 
to remove the undersupply. 
This study focuses on public library services,7 which are supplied mainly by a municipality 
and which residents of other municipalities may also use.8 
Figure 1 shows the number of municipal mergers and the changes in the rate of increase of 
public libraries in Japan between 1999 and 2011. The figure shows that many new libraries were 
built in 2004 and 2005, when many municipal mergers took place. If were no spatial spillover 
effect in library services, and municipal mergers occurred in pursuit of economies of scale, then 
the number of libraries would likely have fallen. Yet, the number of libraries actually increased. 
This may be attributed to municipal mergers internalizing (or lessening) the spatial spillover 
effects and increasing the supply of library services, which were previously undersupplied. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
This study first examines whether free-riding behavior in library services existed amongst 
neighboring municipalities prior to many municipal mergers. If we observe free-riding behavior, 
we use data after 2005, when many municipal mergers occurred, to examine whether there were 
subsequent changes in free-riding behavior. Comparing the changes in municipalities’ behavior 
in these two periods, the study investigates the effects of municipal mergers on spatial spillover 
effects. 
Additionally, this study focuses on the Kyushu region, which is geographically independent 
(i.e., independent from the mainland), and shows trends similar to the Japanese national average 
in terms of municipal mergers in these periods (excluding Okinawa, which is geographically 
independent).9 
                                                   
6 The creation of a higher level of government, such as subsidies from a higher government, as 
in Dahlby (1996), or strengthened cooperation amongst communities, as in Haughwout (1999), 
may be a way to internalize externalities. 
7 Here, “library” refers to the services defined in the Library Act. 
8 There is much research concerning public libraries, including cost-efficiency analysis (e.g., 
Vitaliano, 1997; Hammond, 2002), production function estimation (e.g., Ross, 1977), and 
economies-of-scale analysis (e.g., DeBoer, 1992). 
9 Between 1999 and 2005, the number of municipalities across Japan dropped by 43.7%. The 
 
Section 2 provides the methodology and model specification. Section 3 lists the data sources 
and features, while Section 4 discusses the results of the analysis. Section 5 presents the 
conclusion. 
 
2. Methodology and Model Specification 
This study adopts methods for spatial econometrics to detect free-riding behavior in library 
services amongst municipalities. This analysis uses four approaches. First, we apply an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) model to examine whether the number of external library users affects the 
total number of library users. Second, we investigate the potential spillover effect among 
municipalities regarding public library services by applying a spatial autoregressive model 
(SAR), taking the number of external library users as an independent variable. Although the 
number of external library users could have no effect, there may be a correlation with error 
terms such as similarities of regional characteristics with other (external) areas. To account for 
this possibility, we apply a spatial error model (SEM) as the third approach. Finally, we apply a 
generalized spatial autoregressive model with a correlated error term (SAC model), which uses 
the number of external library users as an independent variable and considers the possibility of 
correlation with error terms such as regional similarities. 
 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝜀                 (OLS) 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑌𝑌 + 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝜀              (SAR) 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝑢𝑢 ;𝑢𝑢 = 𝜆𝜆𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢 + 𝜀𝜀           (SEM) 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑌𝑌 + 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝑢𝑢 ;𝑢𝑢 = 𝜆𝜆𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢 + 𝜀𝜀        (SAC) 
 Where Y is an N × 1 vector consisting of one observation on the dependent variable for every 
unit in the sample (i = 1,…,N). X is an N × K matrix of exogenous explanatory variables. 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 is 
an N × 1 vector of ones associated with the constant term parameter α. W is an N× N matrix, 
usually referred to as spatial weights matrix. β, ρ, and λ are the parameters to estimate and ε is a 
random error term. ρ shows the endogenous interaction effects, where the decision of a spatial 
unit to behave depends on the decision taken by other spatial units. Wu the interaction effects 
among the disturbance term of the different units. λ shows the correlated effects, where similar 
unobserved environmental characteristics result in similar behavior. 
When ρ=0 in the SAC model, we have the SEM model. When λ=0 in the SAC model, we 
have the SAR model, and when both ρ=0 and λ=0 in the SAC model, we have the OLS model. 
Thus, these models share a nested relationship, enabling us to select the most explanatory model 
by examining each with a Likelihood-ratio test. 
 Further, when calculating the above, we must assume the extent of the affected area (W in the 
previous formulae). When a spatial spillover effect exists and external users (i.e., residents of 
other areas) use the library services, distance is an important factor. Thus, this we define W as 
follows: 
𝜌𝜌i,j = 1di,j
∑ 1di,jj  , i ≠ j, Wi,i = 0 ,　　　 
where di,jis the distance between the local government offices of municipalityi and 
municipalityj. Namely, we consider that the shorter the distance from the local government 
offices, the stronger the influence, and we apply the weighting accordingly. 
                                                                                                                                                     
number of smaller municipalities alone (chō, son) dropped to 59.3%. In the same period, the 
Kyushu region saw a 47% and 60.7% drop in the total number of municipalities and the number 
of smaller municipalities only, respectively. We may therefore consider the municipal mergers 
in Kyushu as reflecting tendencies comparatively similar to the Japanese national average. 
We use the number of registered users as a dependent variable (Y) for several reasons. First, 
Solé-Ollé (2006) indicated that crowding spillovers may occur in public facilities such as 
libraries, where both local and neighboring (external) residents use the service. Under these 
circumstances, when any municipality similarly reduces library services, the municipality may 
decide to lower the level of its own library services and free-ride on those of another area. In 
this case, the number of local library users would decrease, and the number of library users from 
other areas would increase. Meanwhile, if there is no spatial spillover effect and no free-riding 
behavior between municipalities, there is no effect on the number of local library users relative 
to the number of external library users.  
Second, the function of public libraries has changed since the Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) announced a guideline for public libraries in 2000 
(Desirable Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Public Libraries: Report). The 
guideline stipulated that public libraries should aim to provide multiple functions: public 
libraries should provide not only book lending services but also a lifetime learning system and a 
network system constructed with neighboring libraries, etc. In particular, even if users are not 
residents of a municipality, they can use most neighboring library services if they register. 
Moreover, many municipalities built public multipurpose facilities, including public libraries, 
for years. In terms of new public management, some public libraries cooperate with the private 
sector to provide many services such as theaters, galleries, museums, restaurants, cafés, and so 
on. 
 Therefore, we believe that it is difficult to evaluate library services by the number of lent 
books and number of books in stock, which were used in previous studies on public libraries. 
However, in Japan, users must register to use public libraries. Thus, the number of registered 
users is a useful indicator of the number of users. 
 Two factors are available as independent variables: variables relating to public libraries and 
variables relating to municipalities. For the public library variables, we have “total floor area,” 
“number of employees,” “number of books in stock,” “number of libraries,” “consignment 
dummy,” and “number of employees × consignment dummy.” Note that this study focuses on 
municipalities’ decision making and therefore uses the aggregated data per municipality in the 
calculations. Additionally, we use “population” and “area” as the municipality variables. The 
next section provides detailed definitions of the variables and their sources. 
 
3. Data and Variables 
The main subjects of observation in this study are the effects for 2004 and 2005, when many 
municipal mergers took place. Here, we take 2001 as the year for the pre-merger analysis, and 
2008 as the year for the post-merger analysis. Nationally, large-scale mega-mergers began in 
Japan in 1999 in Sasayama City and by March 2002, the total number of municipalities 
decreased by 14. However, the Kyushu region, which is the focus of the analysis in this study, 
there were no municipal mergers until March 2002. We thus consider that no effect arose from 
municipal mergers in 2001. 
 We chose 2008 as the year for the post-merger analysis due to the possibility that the effects 
may not materialize immediately after a merger and the implementation of the Greater 
Independence Settlement Area Concept (GISAC) across Japan in 2009. In particular, GISAC 
involves mutual cooperation between core cities with populations of over 50,000 and their 
surrounding municipalities. Analyzing the effects in the year after this initiative was first 
implemented would risk the possibility of observing cooperative behavior as free-riding 
behavior; thus, we choose to analyze data from 2008, a year before GISAC was implemented. 
 Data on Japanese public libraries were obtained from Nihon No Toshokan [Japan’s Libraries] 
and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Kōkyō Shisetsu Jōkyō Chōsa [Survey 
of the State of Public Facilities]. We obtained data on the number of registered users, total floor 
area, number of books in stock, and number of libraries from Nihon No Toshokan. We obtained 
“consignment fee” data from Kōkyō Shisetsu Jōkyō Chōsa. 
First, users must register to use a library, we employ the total number of registered users as 
“number of registered users.” We use “total floor area” as a variable to indicate the size of the 
library facilities. We use “number of employees” as a variable to show the number of employees 
working at the libraries, calculated as the sum of specialist staff, emergency staff, and temporary 
staff. We use “number of books in stock” as an indicator of libraries’ capital. We use “number of 
libraries” as a variable to show the number of libraries within an area. Considering that the 
number of libraries may not be linear, we employ both the number of libraries and its squared 
value.10 
A designated administrator system was established in 2003, which allowed libraries to 
outsource or contract the administrative management to private firms.11 To account for the effect 
of this action, we use the variables “consignment dummy” and “number of employees × 
consignment dummy.” The “consignment dummy” is equal to 1 for municipalities that have at 
least one temporary employee and pay consignment fees, and 0 otherwise. The “number of 
employees × consignment dummy” variable is calculated as “number of employees” multiplied 
by the “consignment dummy.” 
We use a municipality’s “population” and “area” as factors affecting the municipality’s 
environment. The populations and areas for each municipality are obtained from Chihō Zaisei 
Tōkei Nenpō [Annual Statistics on Local Public Finance]. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the pre-
merger statistics for 2001 and post-merger statistics for 2008, respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4. Estimation Results 
Table 3 reports the results of the analysis using the 2001 data. The results of the model selection 
show that the SAC model is the most appropriate. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
The estimation results for the SAC model in Table 3 show significant positive values for 
variables related to library facilities; that is, total floor area, number of employees, and number 
of books in stock. This shows that municipalities with better-equipped library facilities will have 
a higher number of registered users. Meanwhile, the “number of employees × consignment 
dummy” has significantly negative results. For number of libraries, both the simple and squared 
variables have significantly negative results. We obtained no significant results for the 
consignment dummy. 
 Municipal population has significant positive results, showing a higher number of registered 
users for a larger population. We also note the significantly negative results for municipality 
area. Because we assume the area provided when counting the number of libraries as a 
substitute variable for the distance from a library within a municipality, this result shows that 
the more distant a library, the fewer the number of users registered with it. 
The endogenous interaction effect (rho) of the number of external library users shows 
significantly negative results, while the correlated effect (lambda) from external areas shows 
                                                   
10 We also conduct estimations without the squared value of the number of libraries, which 
returned almost similar results.  
11 Traditionally, Japanese public facilities were managed and operated mainly by local 
governments. However, with the introduction of the designated administrator system, the private 
sector (NPO, corporations, or other companies) can manage and operate public libraries if 
permitted by the municipality. 
significantly positive results. The endogenous interaction effects indicate the possibility of 
spatial spillover effects in library services; if a local area improves its library services, then the 
number of registered users will increase due to an influx of external users. However, this would 
also lead to a reduction in the number of registered users because the number of external users 
would drop. In other words, these results suggest free-riding in library services in external areas. 
The correlated effects show that significantly positive results for the correlated effect (lambda) 
may be because education and income levels may be similar among an area and its neighboring 
areas, and thus, these regions may share similar book reading and library using habits. 
 Next, Table 4 reports the results of the analysis using the 2008 data. The model selection 
indicates that the SAC model is the best, as with the 2001 data. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 The estimation results for the SAC model in Table 4 show significantly positive values for 
variables related to library facilities, that is, number of employees and number of books in 
stock. This result shows that municipalities with better-equipped library facilities will have a 
higher number of registered users. However, total floor space becomes insignificant. The 
variables “number of employees × consignment dummy” and the squared value of number of 
libraries also show significantly negative results. The consignment dummy has a significantly 
positive value, meaning that municipalities with libraries that introduced consignment will have 
a higher number of registered users. The estimation results for the municipality variables of area 
and population are similar to those obtained for the 2001 data. 
Furthermore, both the endogenous interaction effect (rho) of the external registrants and the 
correlated effect from external areas (lambda) have the same signs as in the 2001 estimation 
results. Comparing the estimation values for the endogenous interaction effect (rho) and 
correlated effect (lambda) between the 2001 and 2008 data, however, shows that because the 
2001 rho value is -0.816 and that for 2008 is -0.297, the endogenous interaction effect reduced 
in absolute terms. The lambda values of 0.961 for 2001 and 0.894 for 2008 also show a 
decrease, but not to the extent of the endogenous interaction effect (rho). Accordingly, the fact 
that rho reduced in absolute terms suggests that the scale of post-merger free-riding is less than 
before the municipal mergers. 
Next, the consignment dummy is not significant for 2001 and has positive significance for 
2008, possibly because the effects of consignment became detectable in 2008 because 
introducing a designated administrator system made it easier for public facilities to begin 
private consignment, and private firms could handle more consignment-related work. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Most studies on municipal mergers focused on cost reduction effects, merger consensus 
forming, and free-riding behavior between merged municipalities. Other researchers 
investigated spatial spillover effects in the context of free-riding behavior between local 
governments. However, none of the previous research examined whether municipal mergers 
internalize spatial spillover effects. 
Many municipal mergers took place in Japan starting in 1999, and particularly in 2004 and 
2005. Changes in jurisdictional areas also accompany municipal mergers. This study examined 
potential free-riding behavior between neighboring municipalities in library services provided 
by municipalities in the Kyushu region of Japan using data from 2001, before the mergers, and 
from 2008, after the mergers. 
Free-riding behavior may emerge between municipalities when the spatial spillover effect 
occurs. Meanwhile, if there are changes in jurisdictional areas due to municipal mergers, spatial 
spillover effects may be internalized and free-riding behavior may disappear or decrease. This 
study contributes to the literature by verifying this point. 
The results of the analysis showed free-riding behavior between neighboring municipalities in 
the pre-merger period (2001). Similarly, free-riding behavior between neighboring 
municipalities was existed the post-merger period (2008), though at a smaller scale. This 
suggests that municipal mergers may have partially internalized the spatial spillover effect and 
partially lessened free-riding behavior. 
 The results further suggest that whilst private consignments did not result in user increases in 
library services in 2001, following the introduction of the designated administrator system in 
2003, it became easier to implement private consignments, potentially resulting in an increase in 
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Figure 1：Trends in the number of public libraries (Versus the previous year) and municipal mergers 
 
  
Table 1：Descriptive Statistics(in FY2001)  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
The number of registered users 513 6715.766 26549.67 0 428224 
Total floor area 513 587.01 1717.803 0 27988.4 
Num. of employees 513 3.635185 10.14674 0 143.7 
Num. of employees ×Consignment 
Dummy 513 2.24961 5.687954 0 59.6 
Num. of books in stock 513 42430.62 117805.1 0 1499940 
Num. of libraries 513 0.471735 0.995929 0 17 
Population 513 26134.9 88388.38 414 1302454 
Consignment dummy 513 0.241715 0.428541 0 1 
Area 513 81.52988 75.29211 1.31 536.2 
 
 
Table 2：Descriptive Statistics(in FY2008)  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
The number of registered users 247 21026.3 54045.65 0 646225 
Total floor area 247 1498.46 2719.281 0 28633.4 
Num. of employees 247 10.37186 19.55929 0 210.2 
Num. of employees ×Consignment 
dummy 247 4.058704 13.27807 0 146 
Num. of books in stock 247 121069.2 208669.7 0 1815332 
Num. of libraries 247 1.295547 1.895035 0 18 
Population 247 53794.25 130932.5 368 1384820 
Consignment dummy 247 0.198381 0.39959 0 1 
Area 247 170.8089 174.1061 5.68 903.51 
 
  
Table 3： Estimation Results (in FY2001) 
VARIABLES OLS SAR SEM SAC 
Total floor area 2.711*** 2.676*** 2.710*** 2.301*** 
(0.499) (0.496) (0.495) (0.484) 
Num. of employees 543.9*** 558.1*** 544.3*** 828.9*** 
(138.6) (138.6) (137.6) (141.7) 
Num. of employees 
×Commission Dummy 
-146.6 -148.2* -146.6 -232.6*** 
(90.17) (89.27) (89.28) (87.45) 
Num. of books in stock 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.107*** 
(0.01000) (0.00990) (0.00994) (0.00977) 
Num. of libraries -4,570*** -4,623*** -4,566*** -4,655*** 
(808.8) (804.0) (806.8) (779.5) 
Squared of number of 
libraries 
-402.4*** -401.1*** -402.6*** -406.0*** 
(46.53) (46.09) (46.28) (44.73) 
Population 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.106*** 
(0.00898) (0.00890) (0.00892) (0.00868) 
Consignment dummy -1,108 -1,045 -1,107 -265.1 
(1,040) (1,033) (1,030) (1,005) 
Area -4.930 -5.634 -4.967 -11.53*** 
(3.781) (3.872) (3.839) (4.119) 
Constant -1,158*** -675.0 -1,157*** -317.5 
(415.2) (797.5) (414.7) (8,532) 
Rho   -0.0602   -0.816*** 
  (0.0851)   (0.134) 
Lambda     0.0124 0.961*** 
   (0.277) (0.0392) 
Observations 513 513 513 513 
Log likelihood -5164 -5164 -5164 -5153 
lrtest(rho=0)      22.61*** 
lrtest(lamdba=0)      22.11*** 
chi2_lr(VS OLS)   0.5 0.002 22.61*** 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote p-values at the significance 
















Table 4： Estimation Results (in FY2008) 
VARIABLES OLS SAR SEM SAC 
Total floor area 0.398 0.539 0.637 0.504 
(1.027) (1.008) (1.001) (0.990) 
Num. of employees 312.8 269.0 237.5 341.5* 
(192.7) (190.8) (191.1) (196.5) 
Num. of employees 
×Commission Dummy 
-991.7*** -986.2*** -989.2*** -987.1*** 
(116.2) (113.5) (111.8) (110.1) 
Num. of books in stock 0.0557*** 0.0547*** 0.0554*** 0.0514*** 
(0.0171) (0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0164) 
Num. of libraries -285.5 -174.0 81.74 -25.91 
(1,117) (1,093) (1,091) (1,075) 
Squared of number of 
libraries 
-322.7*** -325.4*** -332.6*** -323.8*** 
(83.78) (81.78) (80.92) (79.89) 
Population 0.357*** 0.360*** 0.361*** 0.352*** 
(0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0179) (0.0182) 
Consignment dummy 11,253*** 10,967*** 10,910*** 11,031*** (2,685) (2,629) (2,597) (2,560) 
Area -11.43** -10.22** -11.08** -12.11** 
(4.803) (4.772) (4.855) (4.882) 
Constant -2,929*** -6,090** -3,356 987.1 
(1,119) (2,574) (2,185) (7,126) 
Rho   0.137   -0.297** 
  (0.101)   (0.145) 
Lambda     0.654*** 0.894*** 
   (0.233) (0.106) 
Observations 247 247 247 247 
Log likelihood -2644 -2643 -2641 -2639 
lrtest(rho=0)      3.54* 
lrtest(lamdba=0)      7.27*** 
chi2_lr(VS OLS)   1.828 5.558* 9.099*** 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote p-values at the significance 
levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
